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The paper aims to analyse how income inequality aects social net-
works strength in fourteen European Countries. We introduce some
new evidences by using the ECHP for testing the networks-inequality
nexus and being able to construct directly inequality indices from the
microdata as well their decomposition. In particular, we focus on two
main point: rstly, we analyse how total income inequality could be re-
lated to social network; secondly, we introduce the "clustered network"
denition, by decomposing total income inequality based on the educa-
tion level. We test the existence of a pluralism linkage between Social
Network and Inequality and many results conrm that the linkage is
neither unambiguous nor unidirectional. We introduce and stress some
important issue. Firstly, we use dierent levels of social network: nar-
row, wide and anonymous; second, we use dierent inequality indexes
(dierent sensitiveness to changes at dierent part of the income distri-
bution); third, the ambiguous linkage could be explained on one hand
by the positive role of emulation and reciprocity behaviors and on the
other hand by negative ones of the envy, amoral familism and keep-
ing up with the Joneses mechanisms. Finally, we stress the dierent
roles of within and between components of inequality. Our idea is that
higher income inequality - related to the changing education premia -
could aect social network formation among individuals through two
dierent channels: higher inequality among dierent educated individ-
uals could raise (clustered networks), while higher inequality among
similars could halt the social networks.
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11 Introduction
The main issue of the paper is to investigate how income inequality could
aect a particular dimension of social capital - i.e. Social Network - that is
social relations among individuals (neighbours and friends) and club partici-
pation. In particular, using individual level data from European Community
Household Panel1 (ECHP) we investigate the role of income inequality in
in
uencing social network strength in the European Countries. Then, we
also study how income dierences among similar individuals and among dif-
ferent individuals aect social networks, by using the between and within
inequality components based on the level of education.
On the meaning of social capital we can recall Putnam (1993): ...features
of social organisation, such as trust, norms (or reciprocity), and networks (of
social engagement), that can improve the eciency of society by facilitating
co-ordinated actions.
Hence, social capital has a wide and variable denition: generalized trust,
social network, civic participation and quality of life.
Several empirical studies have just established that income inequality
has a strong and negative eect on social capital. Studying how generalised
trust is aected by some individual characteristics and income and racial
heterogeneity of the community, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) show that
income inequality - as measured by the Gini index - aects generalized trust
negatively with respect the US, using GSS data for the period 1974-1994.
By using two measures of income inequality, the Gini Index and Percentile
ratios, Gustavsson and Jordahl (2006) nd a negative relation between trust
and inequality, mainly due to the stronger eect of changes in the bottom
of income distribution. Bjornskov (2007) nds that social polarization mea-
sured by income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity reduces trust among
individuals.
The paper is one of the rst contribution which investigate the social
network-inequality linkages. Hence, we focus on the Social Network de-
nition and we believe that increasing income inequality, which raises po-
larization in income distribution, could aect ambiguously the formation
of social relations among individuals. In particular, changes in total in-
come inequality could have two dierent eects on social networks: on one
hand, higher income inequality causes a decrease in social network forma-
tion through envy mechanism, on the other hand it could bring the poorer
ones to improve their social links through emulation of the richer ones.
Moreover, in order to introduce and explain our idea of "clustered net-
works", besides the general relation between social network and total income
inequality, we also test the link between social network and within and be-
1We know that ECHP is not a specic and usual survey for social capital while Euro-
pean Social Survey is more pertaining on the matter, nevertheless ECHP oered detailed
information on income and covered a longer period (1994-2001).
2tween components of inequality. It has just been shown that the increase
in income inequality can be explained also by the changes in the return to
education 2. Our main idea is that increasing income inequality - related
to the changing education premia - aects social network formation among
individuals, through two dierent channels:
 increasing inequality among dierent educated individuals could raise
the formation of social networks (between inequality),
 increasing inequality among similar educated individuals could halt
the social networks (within inequality).
Hence, by using three individual levels of education (low, medium, high),
we decompose total income inequality in between and within components.
We expect that between inequality aects social network positively while
within inequality negatively3.
Social network intensity is measured using three dierent proxies alter-
natively: club (participation in club), friends (frequency in speaking with
friends) and neighbours (frequency in speaking with neighbours), that cor-
respond respectively to three levels of social network: anonymous (we don't
know the kind of club), wide and narrow social network level. As depen-
dent variables are categorical ones, we estimate the relation by using probit
model (for club) and ordered probit model (for friends and neighbours)4.
Many results conrm our predictions: total income inequality is related
to the formation of social network both negatively (envy mechanism) and
positively (emulation desire); increases and decreases in inequality respec-
tively at the top and the bottom of income distribution increase the prob-
ability to form social network among individuals. Our idea of "clustered
networks" is supported by the results on decomposed income inequality as
well the fact that while top-bottom growing dierentials worsen the forma-
tion of social network between dierent individuals, the sliding of middle
class toward the bottom of income distribution leads similar individuals to
join social networks.
Our original assumption is based on the idea that the direction of causal-
ity runs from income inequality to social networks, but as remarked by
Durlauf (2002) the direction of causal nexus is one of the particularly weak
points of the social capital literature. We show that income inequality af-
fects social networking formation, but it could also be that the strength of
2See for some evidence: Juhn, Murphy, Pierce, 1993; Goldin, Katz, 1999
3Total income inequality is measured by the Gini Index and Percentile Ratios, while
we decompose the Generalized Entropy Indexes for within and between components of
income inequality.
4We choose the pooled panel method for several reasons, for example we check for the
dynamic completeness condition and the Wald test allow us to accept the pooled panel
method (Woolridge, 2002)
3social relations aects income inequality. Then it could be more appropri-
ated interpreting results in terms of correlation or associations rather than
determinants5.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some important
contribution of the previous literature about the validity of social capital
measurement. Section 3 discuss the hypothesis, the used methodology, the
potential determinants and some descriptive statistics about the economic
relation between income inequality and social network. Section 4 presents
the econometric evidence and the results of our estimations. Finally, the
last section concludes.
2 Social capital denition and heterogeneity
It's hard to dene social capital because of its wide and variable denition.
Social capital has been studied almost only in social sciences for a long time,
at least till then '90s, after the contribution of Bourdieu (1980), Coleman
(1988), Putnam (1993).
Since their studies, social capital increases economic attention and be-
comes one of the most researched socio-economic topic. Several economists
and sociologists have improved the concept of social capital and many em-
pirical studies has been carried out.
Based on some previous empirical studies6, we can observe that social
capital can have several meanings:
 generalized trust;
 condence in institution;
 social network (social relationship and membership);
 political participation;
 civic awareness and social norms;
 quality of life.
Generalized trust is a measurement of the degree of trust among peo-
ple. Condence in institution represents people trust towards several kinds
of institutions such as government, parliament, political parties, European
Union, justice system, et cetera. Social network can be dened as social
interactions (that is club participation) and as social relation (that is social
relationship among relatives, friends and neighbours). Political participation
5the reverse causality problem will be explained in the conclusion of the present paper.
6See Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Helliwell (2001) , Sabatini(2005) ,Gustavsson
and Jordahl (2006), Leigh (2006), Bjornskov (2007), for the principal dierences on the
denition of social capital in empirical studies.
4is political parties membership and it includes active and passive participa-
tion. Civic awareness is the involvement of people in social activities, such
as voluntary organization, reading newspaper and watching television about
local news. Quality of life refers to the degree of violence in society, services
to citizens, concerning for pollution.
Several empirical studies have contributed in identify some kind of re-
lationship between social capital and some economic performance. Most of
previous studies focus on the generalized trust, as dimension of social capital
and they analyse how income inequality and others variables (for example
ethnic heterogeneity) aect generalized trust among people. Focusing on the
meaning of social capital as generalized trust, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)
study how income inequality and racial heterogeneity aect social capital.
Firstly, they nd that generalized trust depend on both individual experi-
ences and features and community characteristics. In particular, low trust
level among US citizens depend on: recent traumatic experiences (i.e di-
vorce, nancial misfortune), belonging to a group historically discriminated
(blacks and women), living in racially heterogeneous communities with high
level of income inequality.
Gustavsson and Jordahl (2006) nd that social capital is aected neg-
atively by income inequality and being immigrant, analysing 21 Swedish
Counties for the period 1994-1998 using the Swedish Election Studies data.
In particular, they nd that the negative relation between income inequality
and generalized trust is mainly explained by the inequality at the bottom
of income distribution, as low-income people have stronger aversion against
income dierentials.
Also Bjornskov (2007) study the relation between generalized trust and
income and ethnic heterogeneity among some Countries and he nds that
higher income inequality, ethnic diversity and belonging to post-communist
societies decrease trust among individuals, while Protestantism and Monar-
chy increase the tendency in trusting each other.
Only few contributions treat directly the social network dimension of
social capital. For instance, Sabatini (2005) studies empirically the causal
relation between social capital and the economic development in Italy and in
particular he study how social capital aects economic performance. He dis-
tinguishes three dimensions of social capital: bonding (strong family ties),
bridging (weak ties connecting friends and acquaintances) and linking so-
cial capital (more formal ties among members of voluntary organizations).
Sabatini nds that: strong family ties and bridging ties among friends and
acquaintances aect negatively human development and the economic per-
formance, while linking social capital connecting members of voluntary or-
ganizations aects positively economic performance. As Sabatini, we focus
on the social capital as social network dimension, highlighting three kind of
social networks, and we analyse how income heterogeneity could weigh on
the social behaviour.
53 Methodology, data and empirical evidence
3.1 Hypotheses: the role of individual features and charac-
teristics of society
What we try to do is investigating the impact on social behaviour of the
income heterogeneity, based on some previous studies, even if they analyse
the generalised trust as dimension of social capital, instead of social net-
work. Moreover, we try to explain the mechanisms (envy, emulation and
reciprocity) through which income inequality could be related to social net-
works. A new issue of this paper is analysing how the two components of
inequality the within and between could aect social networking forma-
tion. Following the Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) scheme, we try to study
social network (instead of generalised trust) as function of two main factors:
individual features and characteristics of the society, i.e. income inequality.
Considering previous studies, we try to analyse something dierent and new
on the relationship social behaviour (social networks) and income inequality.
In particular, our idea is based on the following hypothesis:
1. we consider dierent levels of social networks;
2. we consider dierent type of income inequality: total income inequality
and within and between components of inequality;
3. income inequality plays a fundamental role in aecting social behaviour,
through the reciprocity and the emulation (positive role), the amoral
familism and the envy mechanisms (negative role);
4. income inequality has dierent eects on social networks, consider both
the multidimensional levels of social networks and the dierent kind
of inequality we consider;
5. we introduce the "clustered network" denition, explained by the in-
creasing between inequality.
Social network has a wide meaning and it occurs among several kind of agent
inside the society. For example, social ties occurs among employees, rela-
tives, friends, neighbours, members of an associations and so on. Sabatini
(2005) denes three main social capital dimensions: bonding, bridging and
linking social capital 7. For these reasons, we identify and focus on three
dierent levels of social network. First, we consider a narrow denition of
social network that is interpersonal closed relationships among neighbours.
7The rst one is related to the strong family ties that is the intensity and strength
of the relationships among family members and other relatives; bridging social capital is
the weak informal network among friends, neighbours and general acquaintances; linking
social capital refers to weak formal ties created by people belonging to narrowing voluntary
organizations.
6In this case social narrows are informal and occurs among well-know indi-
viduals that are tied from neighbourhood relations. Second, we consider a
wide denition of social network that is social contacts among friends. The
informal ties are based on several kind of friendship relations: long standing
friendship, school friends, colleagues et cetera. Third, we take an anony-
mous social network denition that is potential formal relationships among
members of some associations, regardless of its typology. We believe that
individuals belonging to a general association are more induced to create
social relationship than a non-member ones.
We study each one of the three level of social network separately and
we analyse if and how individuals features and characteristics of the society
measured by income inequality could be related to the three levels of social
network. Since people tend to make some kind of relationships with similar
individuals, social networks occur essentially among people with same race
or similar age or they happen more probably among individuals that belong
to the same gender. For these reasons, we consider that social network is
in general aected by the following individual characteristics: individual in-
come, age, gender, marital status, occupation status, perceived health, level
of education, leisure time satisfaction, immigrant status. Individual income
has a non linear positive eect on social network in general, because more
income implies more tendency to make social network ceteris paribus, but
this eect is not linear and it diers along income distribution8. Increasing
leisure time with age should determine that older people are more probably
inclined to make social relationships. Gender should aect social network
in dierent ways. If we consider that on the average women spend their
time between job and work at-home, they have less time than men to invest
in social relationships. In particular, women commit themselves to make
social relation with neighbours while men are more prone to participate in
club especially if we refer to trade-union or political organizations. Personal
perception of health should aect social network positively because oneself
health perception represents a sort of degree of wellbeing and happiness. The
same explanation holds good for leisure time satisfaction because perception
of enough amount and good quality of leisure time means more tendency in
social networking. 9. Marital status could aect social network participation
in many dierent ways: we could think at married people as having more
needs to keep in touch with the communities, but also they could have less
time to spent in networking activities. Being employed aect social network
negatively because it means that individuals detract time to the formation
of relationships. More educated individuals should have more incentives to
8So we use logarithmic transformation in our estimates.
9Personal perception of health and leisure time satisfaction could be considerate as
proxies of happiness and it could prove a strong link among happiness and social capital.
On the matter see: Helliwell J. (2001), Clark A.E.(2003), Frey B.S. and Stutzer A. (2003),
Bruni L. (2004)
7networking, as their higher cultural level causes an highest need for social
networks as well it's an incentive for joining similar people, as well the pos-
itive role of schooling networking. Migration condition should aect social
network negatively because of discrimination towards foreigners.
However, the aim of this paper is analysing if and how formation of so-
cial network is mainly in
uenced by the characteristics of the society, as
income inequality. Hence, we test the correlation between social network
and two kind of income inequality, respectively total income inequality and
within and between components of inequality. In particular, income dispar-
ities aect the three level of social network (narrow, wide and anonymous)
in dierent ways, taking into account the level of social network, the type
of inequality index used and which mechanism is overriding between emula-
tion and envy. More exactly, the eect of total income inequality on social
network should be negative for wide and anonymous social network, while
it should be positive for narrow social network. That happens because rela-
tionships among neighbours could be consider a stronger type of social ties
than the wide and anonymous social network. Increase in income inequality
drives richer neighbours to help poorer one, in order to guarantee a good
neighborhood relationships and for future reciprocal advantages.
As we better explain in paragraph 3.5, total income inequality is mea-
sured by dierent indexes, in order to capture the eect of the variability
and the dierent sensitiveness to changes in dierent part (class) of income
distribution; the decomposition of inequality is based on the individual level
of education. Income heterogeneity could be related to social network among
individuals in many ways and we think the most important are the emulation
and reciprocity mechanisms, the envy and the amoral familism 10. In par-
ticular, total income inequality could raise social network process through
the emulation mechanism and the reciprocity. Indeed, an increase in income
inequality drives poorer to emulate the behavior of richer by constructing
social network with them or it could motivate richer individuals to help the
poorest. On the other hand, increasing total inequality could halt social
networks because of the envy mechanism, keeping up with the Joneses and
amoral familism. Indeed, increasing income disparities could make poorer
unable to keep up with the Joneses generating frustration and deprivation,
or it could generate protection among similar (poorer with poorer) and dis-
trust and antagonism toward the richer ones, or nally, since relative income
is a measurement of envy, increased income inequality involves a decrease
in social network just through the envy of the poorer toward the richer.
The paper also explores how income inequality due to the dierent levels
of education aects formation of social network. The changing in education
10The concept of amoral familism was introduced by Baneld E.C. (1958) and it refers
to a cultural pattern characterized by the absence of moral obligations to anyone who does
not belong to the family group, together with a strong distrust toward social and political
institutions
8premia involves an increase in income inequality that in turn aects the
formation of social relationships among individuals. Hence, we decompose
the total income inequality in within and between component, where the
rst one suggest the part of income inequality due to the income variabil-
ity among individuals belonging to the same group in terms of education.
The between component represents the part of inequality due to the dierent
level of education. In particular, we believe that higher inequality among in-
dividuals with the same level of education - within income inequality - causes
envy or keeping up with the Joneses among them that in turn obstruct the
formation of social network. Instead, increase in income inequality among
individuals with dierent level of education - between income inequality - af-
fects positively social network building because it induces the lower educated
individuals to emulate the most educated.
3.2 ECHP survey and data sample
We use individual level data from European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) for the years 1994-2001. The ECHP allow us to exploit three im-
portant dimensions in our analysis: the multidimensional coverage, the cross
national comparability and the longitudinal or panel design. Firstly, ECHP
is a multidimensional survey and provides microdata on a wide range of
topics both at individual and household level: income, social life, housing
condition, health, education, employment, training, et cetera. Moreover,
it is an harmonized and comparable dataset across countries thanks to the
use of harmonized questionnaire and denition between countries. Finally,
ECHP provides information on relationships and transitions over time at
micro level.
ECHP interviews individuals and households every year from a nation-
ally representative sample. In the rst wave (1994) we have a sample of some
60,500 households and approximately 130,000 adults aged 16 years and over
across twelve member states: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, the United-
Kingdom. In the second wave also Austria joins to the ECHP; then Finland
enters in wave 3 (1996) and nally from the fourth wave (1997) also Sweden
joins the Survey.
We are aware about the fact that ECHP is not so specic and detailed
on social aspects as could be other Social Surveys like European Social
Survey (ESS) or World Value Survey (WVS). On the other hand, because
our purpose is analysing the relation between social network and income
inequality over time, we think that ECHP provides a wider and more detailed
information on income and it covers a longer period than ESS. In particular,
WVS and ESS collect information about income only by categorical variables
and at households level.
93.3 Description of social network indicators
Dependent variable - i.e. social network - is measured at three level: narrow
social network, wide social network and anonymous social network, for which
we use distinct proxies. We stress that these three variables are complements
of a unique social phenomena - the social networking - but for some reasons
we will examine in section 4, we treat social network at three distinct levels.
Narrow social network is measured by the frequency in speaking with
neighbours. In particular, we take from the ECHP the following question:
"How often do you talk to any of your neighbours?". In order to preserve
the detailed information on the frequency, we keep the values of the original
answers and modifying only its scale. We construct our rst discrete variable
called "neighbours" that ranges from a minimum value of 1 to a maximum
of 511.
The wide denition of social capital is measured by another proxy that
is frequency in meeting friends and it came from the following question:
"how often do you meet friends or relatives not living with you, whether
here at home or elsewhere?". This variable, called "friends", is the same
of neighbours in its value and meaning12, apart from that it measures the
intensity and strength of relationships with friends and relatives.
Finally, anonymous social network is measured by a third proxy that
is participation in club. The question in this case is the following: "are
you member of any club, such as sport or entertainment club, a local or
neighbourhood group, a party et cetera?". Our variable is a dummy taking
the value 0 if the individual does not participate in a club, 1 if she is a
member of a club. One important facet of our work is that variable club
refers to any kind of associations, what matter is only if individuals take
part in almost one club.
Figure 1 shows the average level of narrow social network (neighbours)
at the beginning (1994) and at the end of period (2001) for each country,
with the exception of Germany and Sweden for which data are not available.
Comparing countries, French has the lower level of narrow social network in
both rst and last year, while the higher level is achieved by Greece. Italy is
in the middle. We calculate the variation for variable neighbours during the
relevant period for each country. Even if the variation has no importance in
each country, we stress the fact that Belgium and Portugal present steady
level of narrow social network; Denmark, Ireland, Austria and Finland have
a slight decrease while the rest of countries have just a small increase.
11This range represents the frequency of speaking with neighbours and in particular a
value of 1 means that the respondent never speaks with neighbours; 2 stands for speaking
less often than once a month; 3 means speaking once or twice a month; 4 means speaking
once or twice a week; 5 means that respondent speaks on most days with his neighbours.
Hence, our narrow social capital is low if the variable neighbours values 1, 2, 3, while its
level is high if it take the value of 4 or 5.
12See the precedent note for the scale description.
10Figure 2 displays the average level of wide social network measured by
meeting friends frequency in 1994 and in 2001 for each country. Germany,
Austria and France present the lowest level of relationships among friends
for both the rst and the last year while the highest level is shown by Ireland
and Portugal. The variation calculated in the relevant period shows that
all countries measured a slight increase in the friends relation building, with
the exception of UK and Denmark. We also stress that relationships among
friends increased considerably in Italy compared with the others.
Also anonymous social network, as measured by club variable, shows
a general increase between 1994-2001 (see Figure 3). In particular, The
Netherlands, France and Finland had a small increase in the intensity of
participation in club; the increase is more important for Denmark, Belgium,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Austria and Sweden while Greece, Spain and UK
had a slight decrease.
3.4 Independent variables
Our regressions include some control variables about the individual features
that could aect the formation of social network: individual income, age,
gender, marital status, occupation status, perceived health, level of educa-
tion, immigrant status. As individual income, we take the logarithm of the
real net income (total year prior to the survey) in PPP. Variable age is clas-
sied in three categories: age measures 1 if individuals is thirty years old or
less, 2 if individual is more than thirty years old and less or equal than fty
while 3 if individual is older than fty. Gender is a dummy variables taking
the value 0 for female and 1 for male; marital status is a dummy variable
with value 0 for not married and 1 for married; occupation status values
0 for not employed and 1 for employed; perceived health is the perception
of own health in general and it values 0 for "bad health" and 1 for "good
health". Level of education is the highest level of general or higher education
completed and we classify it in three broad categories: 1 ("low skilled") for
base education, 2 ("medium skilled") for high-school and 3 ("high skilled")
graduate education13. Finally, immigrant status values 0 if the respondent
is not an immigrant and 1 otherwise.
The characteristics of society refers to income inequality existing inside
the community. We measure it with dierent inequality indexes in order to
analyse how the changes in dierent part of income distribution could aect
social network.
We try to capture income heterogeneity in several ways. Therefore, we
13More in detail, low-skilled refer to the 0-2 ISCED codes (pre-primary; primary or
rst stage of basic education; lower secondary or second stage of basic education), the
medium skilled to the 3 ISCED code (upper secondary education), the high skilled to
the 4-6 ISCED codes (post secondary non tertiary; rst stage of tertiary; second stage of
tertiary).
11use the following inequality index separately: the Gini Index, the percentile
ratios and the General Entropy Index. These indexes dier in their sensi-
tiveness to income disparities in distinct parts of the distribution. The Gini
Index captures the income dierences around the middle (and precisely the
mode) of income distribution. The percentile ratios permits to look alterna-
tively at the dierent parts of income distribution14. The General Entropy
Indexes depend their sensitiveness to the parameter  and could be exactly
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where  represents the sensitiveness of the index to income changes in
dierent part of income distribution, n is the referential population,  is the
mean income and yi is income of individual i.
Table 1 shows initial and nal income inequality measures for all coun-
tries, comparing the Gini Index and some percentile ratio. We note that
inequality decrease slightly in all countries expect for Finland, and Sweden
but it is important to explain that not all the Index show a one-way path.
These happens because of the dierent sensitiveness of the Indexes. In par-
ticular, we note that in some cases the three indexes have dierent direction.
In Germany, the percentile ratio P90/P10 shows a slightly increase in in-
come inequality while the Gini Index shows a decrease and this means that
German sample become less unequal especially for the middle class of the
income distribution. On the contrary, the middle class in Finland knows
a small increase in income disparities as shown by the Gini Index, but the
distance between the richer and the poorer decreased as shown by P90/P10.
By comparing countries and looking at P90/P10, the starting level of
income inequality is high in Ireland, Germany and Spain. During this pe-
riod, income disparities decrease slightly in almost all countries especially
in Ireland and Italy, while they increase in Sweden and Denmark. Despite
the decrease, at the end of the period income inequality is still relatively
high in Spain, Ireland and France. The reduction of income inequality is
mainly driven by the decrease of disparities in the bottom part of income
14We calculate several percentile ratios: P90/P10, P75/P25, P90/P50, P75/P50,
P50/P25 and P50/P10.We use six Percentile Ratios: P90P10 and P75P25, that mea-
sure changes in income inequality between richer and poorer; P50P25 and P50P10, that
represent changes in income inequality at the bottom of income distribution (exactly, be-
tween the middle class and the poorer); P75P50 and P90P50, that indicate the distance
in terms of income of the richer relative to the middle class
15The General Entropy Indexes are a particular class of inequality index and its main
feature consists of the variability of parameter , according to which changes the sensitivity
to income dierences along the distribution. Indeed, more positive is such parameter, the
more sensitive index is to income disparities at the top of distribution, while the lower ,
the more sensitive such index is to dierences at the bottom of income distribution. We
use GE(-1), GE(0,) GE(1), GE(2).
12distribution, as measured by P10/P50 while dierences in the bottom one
remain roughly stable.
4 Econometric evidence and results
Some previous studies on social capital consider it as a unique human phe-
nomenon. Hence, analyses on social capital, dierent from generalized trust,
use often the Principal Component Analysis in order to obtain a synthetic
index as proxy of social capital.
In our case, we retain to exclude the possibility of adopting this statisti-
cal method for several reasons. Firstly, we refer to social network as social
relationships among individuals that has three dierent typology and inten-
sity in its formation process (narrow, wide and anonymous social network).
Second, we think that the underlying economic relation - i.e. how income
inequality aects social network building - is not unique and depends on the
kind of the social network level we analyse. Finally, even if this theoretical
considerations are not strong and convincing, we could not proceed with the
PCA because one of the rst condition, correlation among interested vari-
ables, is not respected. In particular, we control correlation condition and
we nd that club participation is not correlated with speaking with neigh-
bours and meeting friends; naturally, correlation exists between neighbours
and friend, but that is clear and using the PCA for these only two variables
has not statistically and economically sense.
For these reasons we decide to estimate three single equations where de-
pendent variables are respectively: club, friends and neighbours. Our econo-
metric strategy is based on probit estimation for the three single equations
concerning the relation between income inequality and the three dierent
level of social network: narrow, wide and anonymous. In particular, each
equation tests how the individual features and income inequality aect the
probability that the three dierent level of social network occur, controlling
for countries and years. Hence, the estimated equations look like:
Prob(Yi;c;t) =   xi;c;t +   zc;t + c + 
t + i;c;t
where  coecients refer to the individual features while  to the com-
munity features (the various inequality measures),  and 
 represent country
and time dummies respectively.
Anonymous social network, as measured by proxy "club participation",
is a dummy variable and for this reason we use the standard probit esti-
mation with marginal eect at means. Wide social network (frequency in
meeting with friends) and narrow social network (frequency in speaking with
13neighbours) are multinomial categorical ordered variables that require the
ordered probit estimation (with reported marginal eects at means for the
higher category).
In order to exploit the temporal dimension of our sample, estimations are
based on the panel pooled method. Actually, a Wald test is required for the
choice of panel pooled method instead of panel with xed or random eect.
Hence, we test the dynamic completeness condition, that implies that the
scores are serially temporally uncorrelated. To test this condition concretely
we use the Wald statistic on the null hypothesis under which the error term
is not serial correlated and in this way it does not aect the distribution of
dependent variable. The acceptance of the null hypothesis about the validity
of the dynamic completeness condition suggest us that we can use the panel
pooled estimation.
4.1 Individual features
Our single regressions analyse also how individual features aect the forma-
tion of social relations, level by level. Hence, because of their heterogeneity,
we report results for the eects of individual characteristics on anonymous,
narrow and wide social network individually16. We consider the following
individual features: gender, age, marital status, education level, occupation
status, immigrant status, perceived health, leisure time satisfaction and in-
dividual income.
Gender aects the three dimensions of social network dierently: men
are more prone to participate in association and to meet friends frequently
than women, because the last one are narrow by the time-constraint. On
the contrary, women are more prone to talk with their neighbours relatively
to men, thanks to more time spent at home.
Probability of club participating and probability of speaking frequently
with neighbours increase with age at an increasing rate, because rising age
implies more stability inside the family, especially in terms of child care,
hence the possibility for people to have more time to spend in club par-
ticipating and knowing own neighbours. Otherwise, relationship between
increasing age and friendship is negative.
Being married has a positive eect on relationships with neighbours and
on club participating, while it decreases the probability of forming friends
relations because married people are more constraint than no-married ones,
in terms of the less leisure-time and single are more interested and prone to
16The signs of the individuals features coecients do not change if we consider the
estimation with the Gini Index or with Percentile Ratios or if we consider within and
between components for all the three dimensions of social networks. We stress that all
coecients of the individual features are statistically signicant at one percent level, with
the exceptions for the relation between medium skilled and friends that is not statistically
signicant (both with Gini Index and Percentile ratios).
14improve their friendship ties.
Higher and medium educated individuals participate more probably in
club relatively to lower educated ones, while the same relation is negative for
probability of speaking frequently with neighbours. Probability in meeting
friends and relatives are lower for individuals with high level of education
than lower educated ones. We think that level of education are highly linked
with level of income and so we support the idea that people with low level
of education and therefore with lower personal income are more prone to
establish social relation with their friends, thanks to leisure time to invest
in such relationships.
Being employed rather than unemployed aects positively probability of
club participation, while it aects negatively probability of speaking with
neighbours and probability of meeting friends frequently and that happens
because of the time constraint busy at work.
Being an immigrant aects negatively probability in club participating,
probability of speaking frequently with neighbours and probability of meet-
ing frequently friends and relatives, because of racial discrimination17.
Feeling good (physically and psychologically) with own general health
increases the probability of club participation, the probability of improving
friendship and the probability of speaking with neighbours.
Leisure time satisfaction is linked positively to all of three dimensions of
social network, thanks to more disposal time for investing in social network-
ing.
The individual income aects positively the probability of participating
in associations, because being economically successful implies an increase
in personal income that allow them to satisfy their hobbies and in general
other interests dierent from the satisfaction of prime needs, that earlier can-
not satisfy. On the other hand, individual income aects negatively wide
and narrow social network, because high income implies more time spent in
working and less leisure time to invest in friendship. In addition, forming
and preserving strong ties with friends or relatives and neighbourhood rela-
tionships is unnecessarily linked with individual income and often this kind
of relations are created mainly for moral reasons and not for economic ones.
4.2 Total Income inequality and Social Network
In this section we focus on the dierent role of the total income inequality
on the three levels of social networks and in particular we show how the use
of several inequality measures produce dierent results. What we want to
17The negative link between ethnic heterogeneity and social capital has already been
tested empirically. For detailed evidences on the matter see: Alesina and La Ferrara
(2000), Gustavsson and Jordhal (2006), Bjornskov (2007)
15prove, relative to the previous studies18is that changes in dierent parts of
income distribution can have dierent eects on social network and these
eects diers according to the degree of strength (level) of social ties among
individuals.
Looking at the results of our estimations, the general trend shows a
negative relationship between total income inequality and social network,
but with some peculiarities. Hence, total income inequality aects social
networking formation through two main channels, as we discuss in paragraph
3.1: on one hand emulation, reciprocity, altruism and on the other hand
envy, amoral familism, keeping up with the Joneses. The rst one plays a
positive role in in
uencing social network among individuals because poorer
tend to imitate the behaviour of richer and thus to join links with them,
while envy explains why increasing income inequality tend to discourage
people to form social network.
In order to evaluate the impact of changes in income inequality on the
formation of social network, we use the Gini Index and some Percentile Ra-
tios. Table 4 shows results for the relation between total income inequality,
as captured by the Gini Index, and the three level of social network. All
coecients present the predict signs and they are all statistically signicant
at one percent level. In general, increasing income inequality decreases the
probability of meeting friends and relatives and the probability of club par-
ticipating, because of the envy mechanism. On the other hand, increasing
income disparities raise the probability of speaking frequently with neigh-
bours. The dierent result for speaking with neighbours could be explain
by the fact that increasing in income inequality between richer neighbours
and poorer ones could drive the last ones to emulate the behaviour of the
richer. That could happen if we think that relationships among neighbours
are more stronger (like family ties) than links among club members and
among friends or relatives.
Results for the relation between total income inequality - as measured
by Percentile Ratios - and the three level of social network are shown in Ta-
ble 5. All coecients present the predict signs and they are all statistically
signicant at one percent level, with the exception of some coecient for the
dependent variable "friends". Looking at P90P10 and P75P25, results show
that polarization of income distribution generally increases the probability
of joining social network, with the exception of changes in P75P25 that are
negative related to the probability of speaking frequently with neighbours
19. Looking at the income disparities between the middle class and the
bottom of income distribution, increasing income inequality (P50P25 and
P50P10) generally decreases the probability of making social networking, -
18See Sabatini (2005), Degli Antoni (2007), Fiorillo (2005); they study the opposite
relationship regarding our ones: how social network could aect economic performance.
19The small dierent result between P90P10 and P75P25 could be due to the more
sensitiveness of P90P10 to the outliers in the tails of income distribution.
16club participation, speaking with neighbours and meeting friends. Finally,
increasing income distance between the richer and the middle class implies
generally a decrease in social network. Indeed, P75P50 shows all negative
coecients and all statistically signicant at one percent level for each of
the three level of social network. P90P50 coecient is negative and statisti-
cally signicant for probability of club participation, while it is positive for
probability of speaking with neighbours and meeting frequently friends.
Our main innovation related to the previous literature is that we try
to estimate how income heterogeneity could be related to social behaviour,
comparing several kind of inequality indexes. For this reasons, with chose a
synthetic inequality index - the Gini Index - and some percentiles ratios, in
order to capture the variability of the eects according to changes in dierent
part of income distribution and dierent levels of network. Our results
conrm that the relation between income heterogeneity is strongly correlated
to the social ties, but this linkage is not unique rather multiple ones and that
depends also on the mentioned emulation and envy mechanisms, besides the
multidimensional levels of social networks and the dierent kind of inequality
indexes we consider. In order to make easier the comprehension of our results
we collect the signs of the single coecient in the following table:
Table 1: Signs for Total Inequality
TOTAL INEQUALITY CLUB NEIGHBOURS FRIENDS
GINI (-) (+) (-)
P90P10 (+) (-) (+)
P75P25 (+) (+) (+)
P50P25 (-) (-) (-)
P50P10 (-) (+) (-)
P75P50 (-) (-) (-)
P90P50 (-) (+) (+)
Source: ECHP
To summarize our results we can recall that: club participation is nega-
tive correlated to the total income inequality and this link is mainly driven
by changes happening between the middle class and the tails of income
distribution, because of the envy; neighbours networks are ambiguously cor-
related with income inequality, because changes in income disparities around
the middle class aect negatively social network with neighbours because of
keeping up with the Joneses mechanism, while changes changes next to the
tails of income distribution aect neighbours ties positively, thanks to the
reciprocity and altruism mechanisms and the possibility of ex-post favors 20;
nally, meeting friends and relatives is ambiguously correlated with income
inequality too, because the positive is mainly driven by changes at the top
of income distribution while the negative ones is mainly due to changes at
the bottom.
20See Branas-Garza and Espinosa (2005) for a discussion of the altruism mechanism.
174.3 How between and within income inequality aect social
network formation
In the previous section we showed that overall inequality has a negative
impact on networks when we look at club participation while has a positive
impact on neighbourhood relations. Furthermore, the negative eect on
club participation is mainly attributable to dierentials between the middle
class and tails of income distribution while higher dierentials between the
richest and the poorest result in higher club participation. With respect
to neighbours, we found ambiguous results, depending on the percentiles
we choose to represent the income distribution tails. Friends networks are
boosted by higher inequality between the richest ones and the others while
are reduced by higher dierentials between the middle incomes and lower
ones.
In this section we concentrate on the results with reference to the two
channels highlighted in the initial section. Let us recall that mechanism:
we expected that inequality could impact on social network through two
dierent dimensions. When the overall inequality is decomposed into two
components, between and within inequalities - with respect to groups of
similar individuals - we can answer if higher inequality between dierent in-
dividuals boosts the formation of clustered networks and if higher inequality
among similar individuals impacts negatively on social networks.
The idea of "clustered networks" can be clearly understood explaining
the inequality decomposition. We use four General Entropy Indexes in order
to exactly decompose the total income inequality in between and within
components based on the individual level of education21. We can distinguish
individuals through education and classify them into three groups which are
the base for the inequality measures (GE()) decomposition22. The four
measures of inequality account for dierences along the income distribution
according to the  sensitivity parameter: the higher , the more sensitive
is the index to the inequalities at the top of income distribution.
We assumed that increasing inequality among dierent educated indi-
viduals is positively related to social networks, while increasing income in-
equality among similar educated individuals negatively. Our results conrm
our assumptions partially because the linkage is neither unambiguous nor
one-way and the multiplicity of the results depends both on dierent sensi-
tiveness of inequality index to changes in dierent part of income distribution
and on the three dierent levels of social network, as we explained above for
the relationship between total income inequality and social network. Tables
21We use the General Entropy Index for the inequality decomposition because it is
one of the most popular decomposed index while the Gini Index does not admit the
decomposition. For further details see Aaberge, Bjerve, Doksum (2005).
22Classication of the three levels of education has been made on the original classi-
cation of ISCED code. Particularly, we reclassify the original scale into three level of
education: high, medium and low education.
186 and 7 report results for relation between social network and the within
and between components for a value of  of 1 and 2, respectively (the Theil
Index and the half the squared Coecient of Variation). Hence, in general,
results are very heterogeneous and most of the coecient are statistically
signicant, with some exceptions (especially for dependent variable "club
participation").
Our main innovation is that we use the inequality decomposition in order
to test the existence of non unambiguous relationship among social network
and inequality and to introduce the "clustered network" denition. In order
to make easier the comprehension of our results, we collect the signs of the
single coecients in the following table:
Table 2: Signs for Inequality decomposition
INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION CLUB NEIGHBOURS FRIENDS
WITHIN GE(-1) (+) (+) (+)
BETWEEN GE(-1) (-) (-) (+)
WITHIN GE(0) (-) (+) (-)
BETWEEN GE(0) (-) (-) (-)
WITHIN GE(1) (-) (+) (+)
BETWEEN GE(1) (+) (-) (+)
WITHIN GE(2) (-) (-) (+)
BETWEEN GE(2) (+) (-) (+)
Source: ECHP
As we expected, club participation is generally aected negatively by
within inequality, especially by the stronger sensitiveness of similar edu-
cated individuals to changes at the middle and the top of income distribu-
tion, while the stronger sensitiveness at the bottom aects club participation
positively. Because of the "keeping up with the Joneses" mechanism, similar
educated individuals who earn very dierent incomes have less incentive to
join club. The between component of inequality aects negatively and pos-
itively club participation, the rst one is mainly due to more sensitiveness
to changes in income of dierent educated individuals at the middle and
bottom of income distribution even if the coecient for GE(0) is not sta-
tistically signicant, while the relationship is positive for GE(1) and GE(2)
even if their coecient are not statistically signicant. Results for depen-
dent variable Neighbours show ambiguous signs and they are surprisingly
strange, relatively to our assumptions. In particular, all coecients present
the opposite predicted sign (the within component shows positive corre-
lation with neighbours networks, while between component of inequality
a negative correlation ones)23, with the exception of the half the squared
Coecient of Variation which presents for both within and between com-
ponents of inequality a negative correlation with neighbours network, hence
the idea of clustered network for neighbours is never true. Indeed, increas-
23The mentioned Coecients are all statistically signicative with the exception of
within component for GE(-1) and GE(1)
19ing income inequality among similar educated individuals support people to
join links with own neighbours especially when people are more sensitive-
ness to changes in income at the bottom of income distribution while more
sensitiveness to changes at the top implies reluctance to join neighbours
networks; moreover, increasing income inequality among dierent educated
individuals always halt formation of social ties. We want to stress the neg-
ative eect of both the within and between components of inequality on
the narrow social network denition: the more sensitiveness to changes at
the top of income distribution halt neighbours network formation for both
similar and dierent educated individuals. Finally, neighbours relationships
are halted by higher between inequality while are boosted by higher within
inequality; the opposite signs, relatively to our general predictions, could
be explained if we think at a kind of envy that diminishes the probability
of speaking with neighbours perceived more and more dierently and at a
kind of altruism that drive people to help neighbours perceived as similar.
Results for probability of meeting friends and relatives shows that both the
within and between components of inequality aect friendship relation pos-
itively. In particular, friendship networks are boosted by higher between
inequality that driven dierent educated individuals to join clustered net-
works among each other; at the same time, friendship ties are boosted by
higher within inequalities: similar individuals with higher unequal incomes
respond with major long-term relationships, like school friends and with
relationships among similar individuals, like colleagues. For friendship net-
work, higher income inequality make people - similar and dierent educated
people - more altruist than envious and hence reciprocity and solidarity feel-
ings are more important than envy, keeping up with the Joneses and amoral
familism, in driving the friendship network formation.
5 Conclusions
We analysed the relation between income inequality and social network-
ing formation in fourteen European Countries during the period 1994-2001,
using data from ECHP Survey, that allowed us to construct directly our
inequality indexes and their decomposition.
We identify three levels of social network, according to the three prox-
ies used in the estimations: anonymous social network (probability of club
participation), narrow social network (probability of speaking frequently
with neighbours) and wide social network (probability of meeting frequently
friends).
We analyse how social behaviour is aected by two main determinants:
individual features and income heterogeneity. In particular, we focus on two
dimensions of income inequality: rst, we investigate how changes in total
income inequality could aect social networks among individuals; second,
20we analyse how the within and between components of inequality based
on grouped "similar" individuals - with the same level of education - could
aect social ties among them. Total income inequality plays its role through
emulation and envy, while between and within components of inequality
explain the idea of "clustered networks".
Our analysis shows very heterogenous results, according to the inequal-
ity index used and to the dierent level of social network analysed. Re-
sults about total income inequality show that social networking formation
is mainly aected by two channels: income heterogeneity could causes two
opposite behaviour - the emulation and the envy - that in turn aect social
network strength. Indeed, an increase in income inequality drives poorer to
emulate the behaviour of richer ones by joining social network with them.
On the other hand, increasing income inequality causes a decrease in social
network just through the envy. In particular, our results show that higher
income inequality aects negatively wide and anonymous social network -
friends and club participation - while it aects positively narrow social net-
work, that is speaking with neighbours.
We decompose total income inequality in between and within compo-
nents by using the General Entropy Indexes, based on the dierent indi-
vidual level of education. Results conrm our idea of "clustered networks".
Indeed, increasing income inequality between dierent educated individu-
als raises the formation of social networks, while higher inequality within
similar educated individuals halts the social networks.
Our analysis presents some weakness and some strong points. Firstly,
as we mentioned above, literature on social network and in general social
capital could be suered from reverse causality, that is the causal nexus
between social capital and income inequality is not always clear 24. Indeed,
increasing income inequality could aects social networks formation, because
of the mentioned envy and emulation mechanism, but at the same time it
could also be that the strength of social relations aects income inequality.
For instance, it is possible that stronger social relations increase the social
acceptation of more progressive taxation and income redistribution, so lead-
ing to lower inequality or it could be possible that social relations generate
peer-pressure, against 'making more money than the peers', so that reducing
incentives for entrepreneurship, that in turn may increase inequality. In this
paper we did not explore econometrically the problem of reverse causality,
but we stress that social network and income inequality are strongly corre-
lated and the direction of this nexus is still ambiguous. For these reasons,
we can argue that it should be more appropriate to talk of correlation and
24Problem of reverse causality between social capital and economic indicator (inequality,
growth, innovation et cetera) has already been treated in previous literature: Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000), Bjornskov (2005), Gustavsson and Joardahl (2006) analyse how income
inequality aects social capital; Narayan and Pritchett (1999), De Clercq (2003), Sabatini
(2005) analyse how social capital aects growth and income inequality
21associations rather than determinants. What we can certainly assert is that
a more unequal society could have opposite eects on the social behaviour
and this because of the two underlined mechanisms of envy and emulation.
Secondly, a limitation of our analysis is the heterogeneity in the ag-
gregation of dependent and independent variables. In particular, income
inequality indexes are computed at national level while social network at
individual level and the last one as a local dimension, because, club partic-
ipation or social ties among friends and among neighbours are really strong
related to and in
uenced by the area where individuals live. We take into
account this problem - local dimension of social networks and national level
of inequality indexes. We tried to use such kind of more disaggregated in-
equality index but ECHP has lack of data at more detailed level, for instance
at regional or district level, for each countries. However, we can argue that
national income inequality acts on local social behaviour through the cre-
ation of general sense of envy or emulation among individuals, even if at
local level.
Despite some weakness, our contribution presents many strong points
and some innovations. Firstly, we analyse the potential linkage between in-
equality and the social network dimension of social capital, instead of the
generalised trust. Secondly, we also stress that the linkage between social
network and income inequality is not unambiguous and neither unidirec-
tional rather we suggest the idea of more than one linkage between social
network and income inequality. Thirdly, we use dierent kind of income
inequality indexes (the Gini index, six percentiles ratios) and for the rst
time the inequality decomposition based on the education level, in a coun-
try comparison. We also identify three level of social network: anonymous,
narrow and wide social network and we analyse how results on the linkage
between inequality and social network can dier according to the several
kind of inequality indexes and the level of social network considered. The
rst conrmation of the plurality connection can be nd by looking at the
the relationship between total income inequality and three level of social
network. Changes in income inequality could have dierent eects on the
three levels of social networks, according to the dierent strength of social
ties (anonymous, narrow or wide), the dierent sensitiveness of people to
changes along the income distribution and nally according to which pos-
itive (emulation, altruism, reciprocity) or negative (envy, keeping up with
the Joneses, amoral familism) mechanism is overriding. Finally, the most
important innovation of our paper is the use of inequality decomposition,
which better explains the plurality connection between social network and
inequality and the idea of clustered networks. Our results conrm that
there is more than one linkage between social ties and inequality and idea
of clustered networks - rising income inequality among dierent educated
individuals boosts people to join social network with others - is mainly true
for the anonymous and wide denition of social network and when people
22are more sensitive to changes at the top of income distribution.
Our results conrm the strong correlation between inequality and social
networks and that implies the crucial role of the policy makers, both for
reducing income inequality and improving social network strength among
citizens, the community social capital level, with obvious positive conse-
quences for growth 25. Hence, policy commitments should be aimed to more
redistributive policies, to improve public spending in behalf of poorer, to
introduce some tax exemption or reduction for poorer class, to improve ed-
ucation system, to the creation of appropriate spaces and entertainment for
promoting social relations.
25Temple and Johnson, 1998; Knack and Keefer, 1997
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Source: ECHP
Note: Some Countries have di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29Table 3: Income Inequality measures
GINI P75 P25 P50 P25 P75 P50
COUNTRY 1994 2001 1994 2001 1994 2001 1994 2001
Germany 0,429 0,378 3,340 2,622 2,211 1,769 1,511 1,482
Denmark 0,305 0,292 2,017 1,968 1,523 1,517 1,324 1,297
The Netherlands 0,393 0,380 3,012 2,695 1,945 1,809 1,549 1,490
Belgium 0,400 0,386 2,556 2,225 1,755 1,580 1,456 1,409
France 0,472 0,406 3,228 2,797 2,070 1,835 1,559 1,524
United Kingdom 0,424 0,401 3,267 2,772 1,985 1,791 1,646 1,548
Ireland 0,496 0,457 3,523 3,395 1,865 1,940 1,889 1,750
Italy 0,390 0,351 2,923 2,361 2,059 1,756 1,420 1,344
Greece 0,472 0,430 4,989 3,739 2,992 2,208 1,668 1,693
Spain 0,445 0,432 3,103 2,775 1,804 1,710 1,720 1,623
Portugal 0,473 0,424 3,324 2,963 1,891 1,861 1,758 1,592
Austria 0,417 0,383 2,903 2,629 1,928 1,835 1,506 1,432
Finland 0,394 0,413 2,703 2,826 1,822 1,864 1,484 1,516
Sweden 0,277 0,298 1,830 1,824 1,420 1,406 1,289 1,297
Source: ECHP
Note: Finland starts from 1995, Sweden from 1996.
Table 4: Estimates on Gini Index
CLUB NEIGHBOURS FRIENDS
Male 0,1169308*** -0,0200374*** 0,0261706***
(0,0012976) (0,00125) (0,0012)
Aged 31-50 0,0207213*** 0,0617479*** -0,1268538***
(0,0019178) (0,00178) (0,00171)
Aged > 50 0,0272487*** 0,110698*** -0,1629355***
(0,0020803) (0,00193) (0,00183)
Married 0,029409*** 0,0741726*** -0,0131477***
(0,0014275) (0,00134) (0,0013)
Medium Skilled 0,1046547*** -0,0468236*** 0,001722
(0,0016632) (0,0015) (0,00147)
High Skilled 0,1919475*** -0,0933522*** -0,028668***
(0,002098) (0,00173) (0,00172)
Employed or Self-Employed 0,0070417*** -0,0305711*** -0,0046482***
(0,0016883) (0,00162) (0,00154)
Immigrant -0,0757798*** -0,0492014*** -0,0160207***
(0,0028088) (0,0029) (0,00283)
Good Health 0,081693*** 0,0750228*** 0,0809438***
(0,0020689) (0,00204) (0,00182)
Leisure Satisfaction 0,0349046*** 0,0621493*** 0,0650642***
(0,0014107) (0,00134) (0,00127)
Income 0,0145532*** -0,0151955*** -0,0116361***
(0,000652) (0,00063) (0,00061)
Gini -0,847002*** 0,242717*** -0,0837121
(0,0770145) (0,07469) (0,07296)
Obs. number 575.483 589.084 589.459
Pseudo R2 0,1268 0,0954 0,0910
Source: ECHP
Note: signicance *** = 1% ** = 5% * = 10% ; marginal eects at means, standard errors in
brackets
30Table 5: Estimates on Percentiles Ratios
CLUB NEIGHBOURS FRIENDS
Male 0,1169759*** -0,0201913*** 0,0260561***
(0,0012977) (0,00125) (0,0012)
Aged 31-50 0,0205537*** 0,0613044*** -0,1274865***
(0,0019179) (0,00178) (0,00171)
Aged > 50 0,0270535*** 0,1101177*** -0,1637027***
(0,0020804) (0,00193) (0,00183)
Married 0,0294721*** 0,0743347*** -0,0129659***
(0,0014274) (0,00134) (0,0013)
Medium Skilled 0,1040679*** -0,0469314*** 0,0016791
(0,0016625) (0,0015) (0,00147)
High Skilled 0,1918425*** -0,093534*** -0,0286266***
(0,0020986) (0,00173) (0,00172)
Employed or Self-Employed 0,0073193*** -0,0306659*** -0,0042832***
(0,0016882) (0,00162) (0,00154)
Immigrant -0,0759313*** -0,0490384*** -0,0159121***
(0,0028068) (0,0029) (0,00283)
Good Health 0,0820169*** 0,0750133*** 0,0813674***
(0,0020672) (0,00204) (0,00182)
Leisure Satisfaction 0,0350822*** 0,0624697*** 0,0655083***
(0,001411) (0,00134) (0,00127)
Income 0,0145257*** -0,0149424*** -0,0115459***
(0,0006522) (0,00063) (0,00061)
P90P10 0,0176498*** -0,0159034*** 0,0018664
(0,0018737) (0,00184) (0,0018)
P75P25 0,8045754*** 0,500776*** 1,19869***
(0,0626933) (0,0591) (0,05445)
P50P25 -1,286008*** -0,9149806*** -2,029134***
(0,1018317) (0,0962) (0,08904)
P50P10 -0,0482561*** 0,0438996*** -0,0065932
(0,0048629) (0,00477) (0,00464)
P75P50 -1,344203*** -1,436869*** -2,345044***
(0,1247882) (0,11759) (0,11044)
P90P50 -0,2190857*** 0,4203537*** 0,071613***
(0,0326304) (0,02914) (0,02785)
Obs. number 575.483 589.084 589.459
Pseudo R2 0,1273 0,0956 0,0916
Source: ECHP
Note: signicance *** = 1% ** = 5% * = 10% ; marginal eects at means, standard errors in
brackets
31Table 6: Estimates on Between and Within Inequality
Theil Index [Generalised Entropy Index with sensitivity parameter 1]
CLUB NEIGHBOURS FRIENDS
Male 0,116883*** -0,020030*** 0,026161***
(0,001298) (0,001250) (0,001200)
Aged 31-50 0,020655*** 0,061855*** -0,126866***
(0,001918) (0,001780) (0,001710)
Aged > 50 0,027033*** 0,110897*** -0,162993***
(0,002081) (0,001930) (0,001830)
Married 0,116883*** 0,074192*** -0,013128***
(0,001298) (0,001340) (0,001300)
Medium Skilled 0,029416*** -0,046168*** 0,001470
(0,001428) (0,001510) (0,001480)
High Skilled 0,103808*** -0,093205*** -0,028765***
(0,001666) (0,001730) (0,001720)
Employed or Self-Employed 0,191609*** -0,030576*** -0,004664***
(0,002098) (0,001620) (0,001540)
Immigrant 0,006912*** -0,049047*** -0,016103***
(0,001688) (0,002900) (0,002830)
Good Health 0,081638*** 0,075040*** 0,080930***
(0,002069) (0,002040) (0,001820)
Leisure Satisfaction 0,034910*** 0,062105*** 0,065051***
(0,001411) (0,001340) (0,001270)
Income 0,014680*** -0,015251*** -0,011607***
(0,000652) (0,000630) (0,000610)
Within Inequality GE(1) -0,117676*** 0,037275 0,113242***
(0,023762) (0,023740) (0,023880)
Between Inequality GE(1) 0,059812 -0,402512*** 0,198772*
(0,114741) (0,107110) (0,103180)
Obs. number 575.483 589.084 589.459
Pseudo R2 0,1267 0,0954 0,0910
Source: ECHP
Note: signicance *** = 1% ** = 5% * = 10% ; marginal eects at means, standard errors in
brackets
32Table 7: Estimates on Between and Within Inequality
half the squared Coecient of Variation [Generalised Entropy Index with sensitivity parameter 2]
CLUB NEIGHBOURS FRIENDS
Male 0,11687*** -0,02002*** 0,02617***
(0,00130) (0,00125) (0,00120)
Aged 31-50 0,02068*** 0,06180*** -0,12691***
(0,00192) (0,00178) (0,00171)
Aged > 50 0,02706*** 0,11082*** -0,16305***
(0,00208) (0,00193) (0,00183)
Married 0,02944*** 0,07416*** -0,01314***
(0,00143) (0,00134) (0,00130)
Medium Skilled 0,10380*** -0,04638*** 0,00136
(0,00166) (0,00151) (0,00147)
High Skilled 0,19158*** -0,09323*** -0,02873***
(0,00210) (0,00173) (0,00172)
Employed or Self-Employed 0,00690*** -0,03057*** -0,00462***
(0,00169) (0,00162) (0,00154)
Immigrant -0,07593*** -0,04910*** -0,01611***
(0,00281) (0,00290) (0,00283)
Good Health 0,08162*** 0,07504*** 0,08093***
(0,00207) (0,00204) (0,00182)
Leisure Satisfaction 0,03489*** 0,06212*** 0,06511***
(0,00141) (0,00134) (0,00127)
Income 0,01469*** -0,01524*** -0,01162***
(0,00065) (0,00063) (0,00061)
Within Inequality GE(2) -0,00185 -0,00332** 0,00688***
(0,00134) (0,00140) (0,00148)
Between Inequality GE(2) 0,09157 -0,21694** 0,26157***
(0,09920) (0,09330) (0,08922)
Obs. number 575.483 589.084 589.459
Pseudo R2 0,1266 0,0954 0,0910
Source: ECHP
Note: signicance *** = 1% ** = 5% * = 10% ; marginal eects at means, standard errors in
brackets
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